Wyoming Law Journal
Volume 11

Number 3

Article 8

December 2019

Tax Liability of a Transferee
John D. Flitner

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlj

Recommended Citation
John D. Flitner, Tax Liability of a Transferee, 11 WYO. L.J. 188 (1957)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlj/vol11/iss3/8

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Wyoming Law Journal by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship.

W YOMING LAW JOURNAL

Had the plaintiff in the Spriggs case based his claim on right of
privacy, the court by using the test of whether the true publication violated
ordinary decencies would undoubtedly have reached the same conclusion
as by using the test of whether the true publication was published with
good intent and for justifiable ends. By applying the test in the Spriggs
case to the right of privacy cases involving true publications violating
ordinary decencies, the same results would be reached. The true publication that a plaintiff has not paid his debts is actionable in right of
privacy, "3 and would probably be so under the constitutional provision as
not being published with good intent and for justifiable ends. On the
other hand, newsworthiness has been held to destroy one's right of privacy
as being a matter of legitimate public interest and concern,3 4 and this is
almost the situation presented by the Spriggs case in which relief in an
action for civil libel was denied.
The practical effect is that Wyoming's Constitution affords a plaintiff
the same relief in a civil libel action as other states afford in an action for
right of privacy. Since this right was probably developed to evade the
rule that the truth is a complete defense in a civil libel action, a Wyoming
plaintiff need not resort to an action for right of privacy for this relief.
In Wyoming the two actions are in effect identical as they reach the same
result when their rules are applied to causes involving the publication of a
true defamatory statement.
JOHN F. LYNCH

TAX LIABILITY OF A TRANSFEREE
From a tax viewpoint, the United States is interested in transfers of
property because of the possibility of assessing the tax, originally due from
the transferor, against the transferee. The problem has centered on the
question of whether such a transferee status exists that the assessment
of the tax might be upheld in courts. The purpose of this article is to
explore the case law regarding transfers of property, both as to corporations and individuals, and to attempt to show when such a transfer. is not
taxable.
The Internal Revenue Code does not attempt to define a transferee.
The pertinent section' merely states:
(A) Transferees ....
The liability, at law or in equity of a transferee of property ...
(2) Other taxes ....
The liability, at law or in equity of a transferee of property of any person liable of any tax imposed
by this title . ..
33.

Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967, 55 A.L.R. 964 (1927).

34.

Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2nd Cir. 1940).

1.

I.R.C. § 6901 (a),

(1),

(2).

NoTES

This is the extent of a statutory definition of a transferee. In view of this
statutory void, it is the further purpose of this article to show that transferee liability is determined by the fraudulent conveyance law of the state
in which the transaction occurred. The cases define a transferee as one who
takes the property of another without full, fair and- adequate consideration; and regardless of what the transferor may owe, the liability of the
transferee is limited to the value of the property which he has received
without paying compensation therefor. 2 Thus we could visualize a situation in which a transfer would be valid as for consideration received but
invalid as a transfer of the whole, since its value exceeded the consideration received.
Aside from the discrepancies in statutory construction, the question
facing all courts is the proper application of existing law. According to
the reported cases, transferees can be broken down into two main groupings; the transferee of corporate assets and the transferee who receives
through another individual. Insurance beneficiaries are most numerous
in the latter group.
Before examining the substantive law it would be well to note the
struggle with statutory interpretation. The phrase "liability at law or in4
equity"' has been the most significant obstacle. The second circuit,
along with several other circuits,5 has held that neither the above quoted
section nor any other federal statute defines the liability of a transferee.
Since there was no source to which the court felt that it could turn, it
held that the state law governed transferee liability.
Transferee liability in a corporate situation may arise in the following
manner: A, a stockholder, holds stock in two corporations, X and Y, or in
one corporation, X, which holds all the stock of the Y corporation. A
transfers all of his X stock to Y corporation and in exchange receives value
in Y stock. Then the X corporation is dissolved and assets subject to
liabilities are transferred to the Y corporation. Shortly thereafter the
Internal Revenue Bureau seeks to assess A as a transferee for a tax deficiency
of X corporation. One case 0 held that A must pay even though Y shares
2.
3.
4.

Shelton v. Gill, 202 F.2d 503 (4th Cir. 1953).
I.R.C. § 6901 (a), (1).
Rowen v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 215 F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1954).

But

1954), reversed, 217 F.2d 166
see: United States v. New, 123 F.Supp. 312 (N.D. I11.
(7th Cir. 1954). The U.S. district court. was of the opinion that federal law was
sufficient to determine liability, citing Muller v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
10 T.C. 678 (1948); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Western Union Telegraph Company, 144 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Pearlman v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 153 F.2d 560 (3rd Cir. 1945) and other cases. Yet, nowhere in these cases
does the court refer to a statute defining liability. The assumption appears to be
that the point is so well taken that it needs no further explanation. The court also
felt that transferee liability was sufficiently established to overcome any contra
arguments raised. The question of whether state or federal law applied was never
reached by the Court of Appeals.
5. Tyson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 212 F.2d 16 (6th Cir. 1954); United
States v. New, 217 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1954) ; United States v. Truax, 223 F.2d 229
(5th Cir. 1955).
6. Bates Motor Transport Lines, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 200 F.2d
20 (7th Cir. 1952) .
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were issued directly to him. This holding overthrew former decisions7
stating that A was not liable if Y issued stock directly to him when he
turned over his X stock. However, liability always resulted if Y corporation gave its stock to the X corporation and allowed it to distribute the
stock.8 Rationale for the later decision was limited to a recognition of
the fact that the liquidated corporation was left insolvent and unable to
pay its debts. The better view is that there is no liability to A since he
never received property of the X corporation. 9 To be liable as a transferee, this fact must appear. Assumption of liability of the X corporation
by the Y corporation renders the latter liable for X corporate taxes but not
A. A should be careful of his procedure, however. Even the better reasoned
cases have said that if Y corporation pays A directly for his X shares
liability will result, since it leaves the X corporation without assets. 10
Contract law coupled with basic principles of corporation law has
helped the corporate stockholder." Both were considered in a case involving a lessor and lessee corporation with provisions for payment of rent
directly to stockholders of the lessor if certain conditions were met. The
Commissioner argued that rental payments to stockholders constituted
income to the corporation. Failing to collect from the corporation, he went
against the stockholder. But the court held that such payments were to
obligees under the contract as third party beneficiaries. The court could
find no legal principle in existence for a subsequent creditor to reach those
rights. In passing it also stated that a corporation was an entity distinct
from its stockholders, and if payment failed from the corporation, it could
not be traced to the stockholder.
Assumption of an individual guarantor's contract for a consideration
which subsequently failed rendering the corporation insolvent, has been
upheld. 12 Briefly the facts were that the National Security Company
assumed a contract of guaranty that one of its officers had made with the
Exchange National Bank. The officer had deposited $43,750 in the bank
as security for the guaranty. Officers of the Security Company believing
that the deposit would more than cover the bad accounts assumed the
contract for the Company. The $43,750 was insufficient to cover losses
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

12.

Metropolitan Securities Corporation, Petitioner v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
Respondent, 19 B.T.A. 299 (1930).
Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 51 S.Ct. 608, 75 L.Ed. 1289 (1931) ; Hunn v.
United States, 60 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1932).
Vendig v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 229 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1956).
The
Vendig case, four years later, overruled the Bates case where the fact situation

coincided.

Shepard v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 101 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1939).
Harwood v. Eaton, Collector of Internal Revenue, 68 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1933). L.
Hand, C.J. concurring specially, conceded that there was no tax liability if the
corporation were considered as a juristic entity distinct from its shareholders. Hand
felt that the corporation was an association of people who chose the corporate form
for their own convenience and the shareholders enjoyed benefits, even though paid
directly to them rather than through the corporation. But he felt that a transferee status did not exist since the payments were made directly to the individual
from the lessee corporation.
Liquidaators of Exchange National Bank of Shreveport v. United States, 65 F.2d 516
(5ht Cir. 1933).

NOTES

and the Security Company, while insolvent, had to turn over all of its
assets to the bank to fulfill its obligations under the contract. The government claimed this transfer had made the bank a transferee. It was held
that the bank was not liable for corporate debts since the corporation had
assumed the contract at a time when the probability of gain was good.
Since the corporation had assumed a potential benefit, it must also have
assumed any resulting burdens, and no transferee status existed.
Perhaps the solution to the question of transferee liability focuses
more sharply with a consideration of insurance proceeds. The problem
involved is the extent that insurance proceeds may be assessed against the
beneficiary for accrued income taxes of the insolvent decedant. The most
simple treatment of this problem involves a determination of whether the
tax liability had accrued to the transferor at the time his beneficiary
received the proceeds. If such liability has not accrued when the property
13
Unusual
is transferred, the transferee-beneficiary is not liable for taxes.
circumstances have even frustrated the United States in this situation, however. In a situation in which X, from whom the taxes were owing, conveyed to his wife and she subsequently conveyed to her father it has been
held that the transfer cannot be avoided or taxed even though the deficiency
was owing. 14 An antecedent debt was the consideration and the opinion
considered the equities of both parties and considered those of the fatherin-law the strongest. From this case one is led to believe that consideration
need not be present consideration and past performance by the transferee
will support a later, seemingly gratuitous transfer to him.
Georgia 15 has allowed the Government to recover taxes from the
beneficiary to the amount of premiums fraudulently paid. The maximum
amount recoverable in any given situation would be the cash surrender
value of the policy. The test for fraudulent payment of premiums is
resolved by a determination of whether the debtor is solvent or insolvent
at the time of payment.
If the beneficiary has been changed shortly before maturity of the
policy' 6 courts will allow tax claims against the decedant to be enforced
17
against the beneficiary. In a case originating in Missouri, tax deficiencies
existed for 1945, 1946 and 1947. The deceased married Mignon Reinecke
in 1948 and named her as beneficiary of the policy. In 1952 the annunity
contract of an endowment policy matured. The fund was liable for tax
liability of the deceased. Change of beneficiary immediately after accrued
tax liability along with insolvency of the husband were sufficient grounds
to sustain tax liability to his widow.
Sometimes the court, as in corporate transactions, never considers
13. Rosenthal v. Allen, 75 F.Supp. 879 (M.D. Ga. 1948).
14. Holland v. Nix, 214 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1954).
15 United States v. Traux, 223 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1955).
16. Reinecke v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 220 F.2d 406 (8th Cir. 1955).
17. Ibid.
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transferee liability. In a case involving a joint tenancy between husband
and wife' s it was held that such an estate created while the transferor was
solvent was valid. Upholding the validity of a joint tenancy the court
went on to hold that the right of survivorship passed wholly to the wife
and she now held the entirety. Nothing remained to which government
tax claims could attach.
Analysis of the above mentioned decisions leaves one substantial inference. Courts will avoid deciding a case on fraudulent conveyance law
if there exist sufficient facts and circumstances
at make determination
of a transferee status immaterial. Motive, though often considered, is not
determinate of liability. 10 Solvency of the transferor will be among the
first items of consideration. Then it is highly probable in view of the
difficulty with the pertinent section of the IRC that state fraudulent conveyance law will eventually determine liability. It is submitted that while
the IRC sets out the basic outline relating to transfers of property, the
substantive law that actually controls is, in most cases, state law. Thus
any transferee to be certain of his obligations should not only check the
IRC but also his own state law.
JOHN

CONDITION SUBSEQUENT:

D.

FLITNER

WAIVER BY INACTION

Conditions subsequent in a grant are not favored in law and no provision will be interpreted to create such a condition if the language will
bear any other reasonable construction.' When the courts find that there
is a condition present, a waiver is readily implied by all the courts from
any active conduct on the part of the grantor calculated to induce the
grantee to believe that a forfeiture will not be insisted upon. 2 However,
the cases are in conflict when the grantor merely stands by and silently
acquiesces in the breach or delays in enforcing the condition after the
breach.
Several cases express the view that mere silent acquiescence in the
breach cannot preclude the grantor from insisting upon a forfeiture., In
18.
19.
1.

2.

3.

Irvine v. Helvering, 99 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1938).
United States v. Cummins Distilleries Corporation,
Harwood v. Eaton, 68 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1933).

166 F.2d 17

(6th Cir. 1948);

J. M. Carey & Brother v. City of Casper, 66 Wyo. 437, 213 P.2d 263 (1950); Godding
v. Hall, 56 Colo. 579. 140 Pac. 165 (1914); Chute v. Washburn, 44 Minn. 312, 46
N.W. 555 (1890) ; Jeffries v. State, 216 Ark. 657, 226 S.W.2d 810 (1950).
Nye-Scheinder-Fowler Grain Co. v. Hopkins, 99 Neb. 244, 155 N.W. 1097 (1916),
where grantor received benefits with knowledge of the breach; M.R.M. Realty Co.
v. Title Guaranty & Turst Co., 270 N.Y. 120, 200 N.E. 666 (1936), where grantor's
actions rendered performance of the condition impossible.
Ralston v. Hatfield, 81 Ind.App. 641, 143 N.E. 887 (1924); Trustees of Union College
v. City of New York, 173 N.Y. 38, 65 N.E. 853 (1903) ; Gray v. Blanchard, 25 Mass.
(8 Pick) 284 (1829); Howe v. Lowell, 171 Mass. 575, 51 N.E. 536 (1894); Hannah v.
Culpepper, 213 Ala. 319, 104 So. 751 (1925).

